Capturing the Ups and Downs in Coronavirus Equity Markets

Image by ChristianChan from iStock.

By KENT HARGIS, SAMMY SUZUKI & JILLIAN GELIEBTER/Alliance Bernstein

Several equity factors diverged significantly from their typical performance patterns during the COVID-19 crisis. By understanding how factor returns behaved in this market correction relative to their historic norms, investors can not only prepare for future volatility but also take advantage of short-term market dislocations.

Challenges to Safety Stocks

Factors, groups of stocks that target specific drivers of return across an index or market, had startling performance results during the coronavirus market disruption. Minimum Volatility (Min Vol) stocks outperformed the MSCI World Index in the sell-off though their downside protection was not as strong as usual, and their upside capture was lower than expected in the subsequent market rally. Value stocks fell further than expected and then failed to outperform during the rebound—as they typically do.

WHAT IT MEANS: The MSCI World Index is a broad global equity index that represents large and mid-cap equity performance across all 23 developed markets countries.

But Growth stocks delivered the most surprising results. This was the only factor to protect much better than expected during the downturn, and then also outperform in the bounce off the bottom.

Investors can evaluate these patterns by looking at upside/downside capture. Upside capture measures how much the factor increased relative to a rising broad market. Downside capture measures how much the factor declines relative to the falling market.

By combining these measures—upside capture minus downside capture—we can evaluate total market capture as a spread. A positive spread means the factor collects more good times than bad times, which may lead to outperformance over time. Likewise, a negative spread means the factor accumulates more bad times than good, a result that often leads to underperformance.

Comparing the spread between the upside/downside capture ratio this year to historic norms shows just how different recent performance patterns have been.

For both Min Vol and Value, the upside/downside capture spread was roughly 30% worse than average. For Min Vol stocks, the performance during the downturn was particularly surprising, as these stocks usually provide protection in a falling market. In contrast, Growth stocks posted a positive spread of 29% over average.

Click chart to enlarge.

Unusual Circumstances Create Unusual Opportunities

COVID-19 shutdowns created an unconventional cause for the correction and may have played a hand in the unlikely sector performance results.

This time around, investors didn’t flock to the traditional relative safety of low-volatility sectors like utilities and real estate during the sell-off. Instead, they congregated in growth companies like online retail, at-home media and technology hardware and equipment—industries that benefited from the health crisis and lockdowns. The performance of the industries, both favored and slighted, contributed to the uncharacteristic upside/downside captures for the factors shown above.

No Norm Here, New or Not

Will these patterns be the new norm? Too hard to say. But the distortions may provide opportunities for investors to rebalance portfolios. Since 2013, Min Vol stocks have not been this cheap, and Growth has not been more expensive.

However, not all Growth stocks are created or valued equally. There are a wide variety of growth businesses with wildly differing valuations, so selectivity is key. And quality defensive investments currently offer some of the best risk-adjusted return potential, in our view.

The world remains an uncertain place. COVID-19 cases continue to increase, US-China tensions are high, economic ambiguity persists, not to mention the upcoming US election. Over the long term, we believe a dynamic defensive strategy can help fuel an offense during volatile market episodes.

The types of stocks that provide protection in a crisis are always changing. By finding select high-quality defensive stocks for a given crisis at reasonable prices, investors can reduce losses in a sell-off, which makes it easier to recover when markets rebound.

Alliance Bernstein is an Associate Member of TEXPERS.The views expressed herein do not constitute research, investment advice or trade recommendations and do not necessarily represent the views of all AB portfolio-management teams or TEXPERS and are subject to revision over time. MSCI makes no express or implied warranties or representations and shall have no liability whatsoever with respect to any MSCI data contained herein.

About the Authors: 

Kent Hargis, Co-chief Investment Officer, Strategi Core Equities

Kent Hargis was promoted to Co-Chief Investment Officer of Strategic Core Equities at AB in 2018. He has been managing the Global, International and US portfolios since their inception in September 2011, and the Emerging Markets Strategic Core portfolio since January 2015. Hargis was named Head of Quantitative Research for Equities in 2009, with responsibility for overseeing the research and application of risk and return models across the firm’s equity portfolios. He joined the firm in October 2003 as a senior quantitative strategist. 

Sammy Suzuki, CFA, Co-chief Investment Officer, Strategi Core Equities

Sammy Suzuki was promoted to Co-Chief Investment Officer of Strategic Core Equities in 2018. He has been managing the Emerging Markets Strategic Core portfolio since its inception in July 2012, and the global, international and US portfolios since 2015. Suzuki has managed portfolios for well over a decade. From 2010 to 2012, he also held the role of director of Fundamental Value Research, where he managed 50 fundamental analysts globally. Prior to managing portfolios, Suzuki spent a decade as a research analyst. He joined AB in 1994 as a research associate covering the capital equipment industry, and then became an analyst covering the technology industry. 

Jillian Geliebter, CAIA, Director, Equities

Jillian Geliebter is a Director of AB’s Equities business. In this role, she works with the firm’s research and portfolio-management teams, as well as with clients around the world. Previously, Geliebter was a senior RFP writer for AB’s Equities services. She has been with the firm since 2009.

BY PHIL DESANTIS, Westwood Holdings Group

As a high-performing equity market environment lifted most stocks over the last decade, the value proposition for active management in efficient asset classes such as U.S. Large Cap has been scrutinized by both institutional and retail investors alike.

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Mutual fund investors paid a staggering $100 billion dollars in expenses to underperforming asset managers over the last ten calendar years.

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Read more in our whitepaper, “Mission Possible: Changing the Probability of Winning for Active Investors.”
The views expressed herein do not constitute research, investment advice or trade recommendations, do not necessarily represent the views of Westwood Holdings Group nor TEXPERS, and are subject to revision over time.

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